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Abstract
Estimating the relationship between skill and overconfidence**
The Dunning–Kruger effect states that low performers vastly overestimate their 
performance while high performers more accurately assess their performance. 
Researchers usually interpret this empirical pattern as evidence that the low skilled 
are vastly overconfident while the high skilled are more accurate in assessing their 
skill. However, measurement error alone can lead to a negative relationship between 
performance and overestimation, even if skill and overconfidence are unrelated. To clarify 
the role of measurement error, we restate the Dunning–Kruger effect in terms of skill 
and overconfidence. We show that we can correct for bias caused by measurement error 
with an instrumental variable approach that uses a second performance as instrument. 
We then estimate the Dunning–Kruger effect in the context of the exam grade 
predictions of economics students, using their grade point average as an instrument 
for their exam grade. Our results show that the unskilled are more overconfident than 
the skilled. However, as we predict in our methodological discussion, this relationship is 
significantly weaker than ordinary least squares estimates suggest.
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1. Introduction 
Dunning and Kruger (1999) argue that the low skilled are typically vastly overconfident while 
the high skilled assess their skill more accurately. As evidence for this argument, they present 
an empirical pattern that is now known as the Dunning–Kruger effect: For many different 
tasks, low performers typically vastly overestimate their performance while high performers 
more accurately assess their performance (Dunning, 2011). 
This evidence, however, is not sufficient, because measurement error alone can cause 
low performers to overestimate their performance more than high performers. To understand 
why, we first need to distinguish between skill and overconfidence and their measures 
performance and overestimation. Performance is the score on a test and overestimation is the 
difference between the expected and the actual test score. Performance measures skill with 
some error. We define skill as the ability to perform well on a given test and we can think of 
measurement error as luck on this test. Overestimation measures overconfidence, the 
difference between self-assessed and actual skill.
1
 
The source of the bias is that researchers typically use the same performance to 
measure skill and to calculate overestimation. The same measurement error component is 
therefore part of performance and overestimation. To see how this can contribute to the 
Dunning–Kruger effect, consider a person with bad luck on a test: Bad luck decreases 
performance and increases overestimation and thus makes the person appear less skilled and 
more overconfident. 
                                                 
1 
In their survey of the overconfidence literature, Moore and Healy (2008) define overestimation as 
overestimation of one’s actual performance, overplacement as overestimation of one’s performance relative to 
others, and overprecision as excessive precision in one’s beliefs. While these definitions are helpful in 
distinguishing between the different domains of overconfidence, they are all defined in terms of actual outcomes, 
which may be affected by measurement error. We thus follow Moore and Healy’s definition of overestimation 
and additionally define overconfidence as the overestimation of one’s skill. 
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In the methodological part of this paper, we discuss the role of measurement error in 
the estimation of the Dunning–Kruger effect. We first restate the effect in terms of skill and 
overconfidence instead of their measures. We then show how measurement error causes an 
overestimation of the Dunning–Kruger effect and the assumptions under which we can correct 
for this bias with an instrumental variable (IV) approach. 
In the empirical part of this paper, we estimate the Dunning–Kruger effect with a 
sample of economics students who we asked four weeks before the exam to predict their exam 
performance. In line with the previous literature, we find that students who performed poorly 
on the exam also vastly overestimated their exam performance. We then estimate the 
Dunning–Kruger effect with an IV approach, using students’ first-year grade point average 
(GPA) as an instrument for their exam performance. Our results confirm that the effect exists: 
The low skilled are vastly overconfident and the high skilled are more accurate in assessing 
their skill. As predicted by our methodological discussion, this effect is, however, 
significantly smaller than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates suggest. 
Krueger and Mueller (2002) are the first to have pointed out that measurement error 
can cause bias in the estimation of the Dunning–Kruger effect.2 They correct for this bias by 
using two test performances: one to measure skill and one to calculate overestimation. They 
then regress overestimation calculated with the first performance on the second performance. 
The advantage of this approach is that it breaks the mechanical relationship between 
performance and overestimation, because the measurement error parts are now different for 
both variables. The disadvantage of this approach, however, is that the measurement error of 
the second performance (the independent variable) may bias the estimates toward zero. Low 
                                                 
2
 Krueger and Mueller (2002) argue that the Dunning–Kruger effect may be a statistical artifact caused by 
regression effects and the better-than-average effect. Their argument is that regression effects would lead to 
equal overestimation for low performers and underestimation for high performers. However, the fact that people 
are generally overconfident leads to an increase in the overestimation of the low performers and a decrease in the 
underestimation of the high performers. These two forces together therefore lead to the high overestimation of 
the low performers and the accurate performance assessment of the high performers.  
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test–retest correlations of the test performances used by Krueger and Mueller (2002) suggest 
this measurement error is substantial (the test–retest correlation is 0.17 for their difficult test 
and 0.56 for their easy test). This could be why Krueger and Mueller do not find evidence of 
the Dunning–Kruger effect. 
In response to Krueger and Mueller (2002), Ehrlinger et al. (2008) estimate the 
Dunning–Kruger effect using reliability-adjusted OLS. They regress overestimation on 
performance and then divide the estimated performance coefficient by a measure of the test’s 
reliability. They thus present evidence of the Dunning–Kruger effect. Their approach is, 
however, problematic, because they still use the same performance as a measure of skill and 
to calculate overestimation. The performance coefficient of this regression is therefore likely 
biased and adjusting for test reliability only increases this bias.
3
 
2. Dunning–Kruger Effect 
The setup of Dunning–Kruger effect studies is straightforward. Participants take a test in a 
given domain (e.g., English grammar, understanding humor, gun safety knowledge) and guess 
their performance on this test either before or after the test. The main finding is that bottom 
quartile performers vastly overestimate their performance while top quartile performers more 
accurately assess their performance.
4
 This finding has been widely replicated with different 
populations and for a number of different tasks (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Ryvkin, Krajč, & 
Ortmann, 2012; Schlösser, Dunning, Johnson, & Kruger, 2013). 
Dunning and Kruger (1999) interpret this finding as evidence of a negative 
relationship between skill and overconfidence as opposed to merely an empirical pattern, 
which can be seen from the title of their paper: “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How 
                                                 
3
 See Feld (2014) for a more extensive discussion on the biases of other estimation methods. 
4
 When using relative performance measures, high-performing individuals typically slightly underestimate their 
performance. Kruger and Dunning (1999) explain this with the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 
1977), which states that people tend to overestimate the degree to which people are similar to them. The high-
skilled overestimate the performance of others and therefore slightly underestimate their relative performance. 
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Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments.” 
They further argue that differences in metacognitive skills between the low and high skilled 
drive this relationship. The idea is that the skills necessary to perform well are also those 
necessary to evaluate one’s performance accurately. The low skilled therefore perform badly 
and lack the metacognitive skills to realize it.
5
 As evidence for this explanation, Dunning and 
Kruger show that a randomly assigned training can increase competence and decrease the 
overestimation of low performers. 
3. Estimating the Dunning–Kruger Effect 
3.1. Key Variables 
We define skill broadly as the ability to perform well on a given test. Skill, however, is 
imperfectly measured by performance, which is partly determined by luck. We use the terms 
luck and measurement error interchangeably to refer to all factors besides skill that influence 
test performance. We therefore define performance 𝑝 as the sum of skill 𝑠∗ and a classical 
measurement error component 𝜀 (asterisks indicate unobserved variables and we omit 
individual subscripts to simplify notation):  
 𝑝 ≡ 𝑠∗ +  𝜀. (1) 
Classical measurement error means that 𝜀 is a random error term with a mean of zero and 
independent of all variables included in the regression and the error term. 
                                                 
5
 Krajč and Ortmann (2008) propose an alternative explanation for the Dunning–Kruger effect. They observe 
that many of the studies showing the Dunning–Kruger effect use students from very selective institutions and 
argue that the students’ skills in these samples follow a J-distribution equivalent to the upper tail of a normal 
distribution. The authors then show that the Dunning–Kruger pattern can arise even if people make random 
judgment errors, due to the J-distribution of skills and floor and ceiling effects caused by the test scale. In 
response, Schlösser et al. (2009) argue that, because student admission is based on many criteria, even in very 
selective institutions, skill is likely close to normally distributed. They then show that, even in the rare cases 
where skill follows a J-distribution, the Krajč–Ortmann explanation would only account for a small fraction of 
the observed Dunning–Kruger effect. 
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We define overconfidence as the difference between self-assessed skill and actual 
skill, that is, 𝑜𝑐∗ ≡ 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓−𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 
∗ −  𝑠∗. Overconfidence, however, is imperfectly measured 
by overestimation, that is, the difference between expected and actual performance:  
  𝑜𝑒 ≡ 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝 −  𝑝. (2) 
We further assume that people state their self-assessed skill when asked about their 
expected performance 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝. Expected performance is therefore the sum of a person’s actual 
skill and overconfidence:
6
 
 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝 ≡ 𝑠
∗ + 𝑜𝑐∗ = 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓−𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 
∗  (3) 
When we decompose overestimation into its respective elements, shown in Equations 
(1) and (3), we can see that it is equal to overconfidence minus measurement error:  
 
𝑜𝑒 = (𝑠∗ + 𝑜𝑐∗) - (𝑠∗ +  𝜀) , 
𝑜𝑒 = 𝑜𝑐∗ − 𝜀. 
(4) 
We can see from Equations (1) and (4) that the same measurement error component is 
part of performance and overestimation. This is the source of the OLS bias. Intuitively, we 
can see that bad luck (i.e., negative 𝜀) decreases performance and increases overestimation 
and thus make the test taker appear less skilled and, at the same time, more overconfident. 
3.2. Restating the Dunning–Kruger Effect in Terms of Skill and Overconfidence 
We model overconfidence 𝑜𝑐∗ as a linear function of skill 𝑠∗ and an error term u that captures 
individual differences in overconfidence unrelated to skill: 
 𝑜𝑐∗ = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑠
∗ + 𝑢. (5) 
Equation (5) provides a simple framework to restate the Dunning–Kruger effect in terms of 
skill and overconfidence. The (restated) Dunning–Kruger effect is that overconfidence among 
                                                 
6
 Besides expected skill, a number of other factors might influence a person’s expected performance. When 
expected performance is elicited before the test, as in this paper, these other factors are arguably unrelated to 
skill and measurement error and therefore do not affect Dunning–Kruger effect estimates. 
6 
 
the low skilled is large and positive (𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠
∗ is large and positive for low values of 𝑠∗) while 
overconfidence among the high skilled is small in absolute value (𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠
∗ is small in 
absolute value for high values of 𝑠∗). This effect implies that skill is negatively related to 
overconfidence, which means that 𝛽1 is negative. To focus our discussion on the role of 
measurement error, we assume throughout that the error term 𝑢 has a mean of zero and is 
independent of all included variables. 
3.3. OLS Bias 
Researchers typically estimate the Dunning–Kruger effect by either regressing overestimation 
on performance or by showing the average overestimation by performance quartile (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999; Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Ehrlinger, et al., 2008; Ryvkin, et al., 
2012). Both approaches result in biased estimates for similar reasons and we focus on 
showing the bias in a regression framework. 
To show the OLS bias, we express Equation (5) in terms of observable variables. It 
follows from Equations (1) and (4) that 𝑜𝑐∗ = 𝑜𝑒 + 𝜀 and 𝑠∗ = 𝑝 − 𝜀. When we substitute 
these into Equation (5) and rearrange, we obtain the following expression: 
𝑜𝑒 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑝 + 𝑢 − 𝜀(1 + 𝛽1), 
𝑜𝑒 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑝 + 𝜔, 
(6) 
which shows that simply regressing overestimation on performance leads to biased estimates 
of 𝛽1 because the luck component of performance is also part of the composite error term 𝜔 = 
𝑢 − 𝜀(1 + 𝛽1). 
We can then show the direction of the bias with the formula for the bias of the simple 
OLS slope estimator, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝,𝜔)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
. When we decompose and rearrange this bias, we can rewrite it 
as 
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−(1 + 𝛽1)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
. (7) 
Equation (7) shows that the sign of the bias depends on 𝛽1. We expect 𝛽1 > -1 because 
𝛽1 ≤ -1 would mean that self-assessed skill stays constant or even declines with actual skill. 
In addition, 𝛽1 ≤ -1 means that a one-point increase in skill causes overconfidence to decrease 
by at least one point. Because self-assessed skill is simply the sum of skill and overconfidence 
(see Eq. (3)), this would mean that, as skill increases, a person’s self-assessed skill would stay 
constant (if 𝛽1 = -1) or even decrease (if 𝛽1 < -1), an unrealistic scenario. If 𝛽1 > -1, it is 
straightforward to see that the OLS bias is negative. We therefore expect OLS estimates to be 
more negative than 𝛽1 (i.e., larger in absolute terms) and therefore overestimate the Dunning–
Kruger effect. 
The size of the bias depends on the true relationship between skill and overconfidence 
and the degree of measurement error. To obtain an idea about its potential magnitude, 
consider, for example, that there is no relationship between skill and overconfidence (i.e., 
𝛽1 = 0) and the ratio of measurement error variance to performance variance is one-half (i.e., 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
= 0.5).7 We can see from Equation (7) that the OLS bias is -0.5. In this example, OLS 
estimates, on average, show that a one-point increase in performance is associated with a 
decrease of 0.5 in overestimation, even though skill and overconfidence are unrelated. 
3.4. Correcting for Bias Caused by Measurement Error with IVs 
What do we mean by correcting for bias caused by measurement error? Imagine a situation in 
which we could perfectly measure skill and overconfidence. In this situation, we could simply 
regress overconfidence on skill without worrying about measurement error. The following 
equation shows the skill coefficient of such a regression: 
                                                 
7
 A standard way to quantify the degree of measurement error is test reliability, which is defined as 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠∗)/
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝). If measurement error is random, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠∗)/𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)/𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝) = 1 and, so, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)/𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝) is 
simply one minus test reliability.  
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𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐∗, 𝑠∗)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠∗)
. (8) 
This skill regression coefficient is our benchmark. We say that IV corrects for measurement 
error if the IV estimator of 𝛽1 is equal to Equation (8). 
To use the IV method, we need a second performance, 𝑝2, as an IV:  
𝑝2 ≡ 𝑠
∗ +  𝜀2, (9) 
where 𝜀2 is the measurement error term. The IV estimator of 𝛽1 is then equal to 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑒,𝑝2)
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝,𝑝2)
. 
We can decompose the IV estimator to show the assumptions under which it corrects 
for measurement error: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐∗, 𝑠∗) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐∗, 𝜀2) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀, 𝑠
∗) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀, 𝜀2))
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠∗) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠∗, 𝜀2) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀, 𝑠∗) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀, 𝜀2))
. (10) 
We can see from Equation (10) that, if luck in both skill measures is random, the IV estimator 
is equal to the skill regression coefficient shown in Equation (8), because all the covariances 
with the measurement error terms are equal to zero. More specifically, we assume that the 
original performance measures skill with classical measurement error, which implies that the 
measurement error component of the original performance is unrelated to skill (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀, 𝑠∗) =
0). If this is the case, the IV estimator corrects for measurement error if the measurement 
error of the second performance (the instrument) is uncorrelated with overconfidence 
(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐∗, 𝜀2) = 0), skill (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠
∗, 𝜀2) = 0), and the measurement error of the original 
performance (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀, 𝜀2) = 0). 
3.5. Eliciting Performance Expectations after the Test 
So far, we have discussed the estimation bias when expected performance is elicited before 
instead of after the test. This approach simplifies the discussion of the estimation bias and 
matches our empirical application. In many studies, however, researchers elicit performance 
expectations after the test (e.g., Kruger and Dunning, 1999; Ehrlinger et al., 2008). We 
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extensively discuss how this difference in study design affects estimates of the Dunning–
Kruger effect in Section A1 of the Appendix. The busy reader can skip this discussion and 
take away three key points. First, the empirical relationship between skill and overconfidence 
may be different after the test. Having taken a test provides feedback about one’s skill and 
Ryvkin, Krajč, and Ortmann (2012) have shown that feedback improves calibration, 
particularly among the low-skilled. This finding suggests that the Dunning–Kruger effect is 
less pronounced after the test. Second, the test taker may know part of his or her luck after the 
test. Accounting for this luck when stating expected performance can decrease the estimation 
bias. However, OLS estimates are still biased and potentially overestimate the Dunning–
Kruger effect if at least part of the test luck is still unknown after the test. Third, we can still 
correct for bias caused by measurement error with IV estimation. All we need is a second 
performance as an instrument, as long as the measurement error of this performance is 
uncorrelated with skill, overconfidence, and the known and unknown luck on the test. 
 
4. Data 
We estimate the Dunning–Kruger effect with a sample of 89 economics students of a second-
year bachelor course at the School of Business and Economics of Maastricht University, in 
the Netherlands.
8
 The course was given in March and April 2013. A total of 94 percent of the 
students in our sample were in the same bachelor of economics program and the course is 
compulsory for specialization in this program. The remaining 6 percent took the course as an 
elective. In total, 75 (84 percent) students filled out the questionnaire. The remaining 14 
students were not present on the day the questionnaire was distributed in the classroom, either 
because they missed the particular session or had already dropped out of the course. Because 
Maastricht is close to the German border, the School of Business and Economics has a large 
                                                 
8 See Feld, Salamanca, and Hamermesh (2016) for more information on the school’s institutional background. 
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share of German students. In our estimation sample, 48 percent of students are German and 30 
percent are Dutch; 28 percent are female.
9
 
We elicited students’ predictions of their exam grades with a questionnaire four weeks 
before the exam. Grades are given on a scale from zero (lowest) to 10 (highest). The minimal 
exam grade necessary to pass the course is 5.5. To encourage students to state their honest 
expectations, we incentivized the exam grade predictions by holding a lottery draw in which 
students could win one of two gift vouchers worth €20 if their prediction was within 0.25 
points of their actual exam grade (see the questionnaire in the Appendix). Furthermore, the 
students were assured that all information would be kept confidential. Information on actual 
grades was provided by the course coordinators; information on student characteristics and 
previous grades was taken from the administrative records. The final estimation sample 
comprises 67 students due to missing data on final grades and GPAs. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the estimation sample of students’ 
predictions, the actual grades, the resulting over- and underestimation, and the students’ GPAs 
at the end of the first year, which consists of eight different grades for the typical student.
10
 
On average, students significantly overestimated their exam grades by 0.63 grade points (p = 
0.004). Figure 1 shows the distribution of exam grades. 
                                                 
9
 We also collected similar data from another course, which we do not use in this paper because bunching of 
grades at the highest possible exam grade for this course makes the classical measurement error assumption 
unrealistic. Including this course hardly changes our estimates. We furthermore elicited students’ expectations 
about the percentile of their exam grades and their participation grades. We do not use students’ percentile 
expectations because the grade percentile is a relative performance measure and the classical measurement error 
assumption is therefore unrealistic. We do not use the participation grade predictions to test the Dunning–Kruger 
effect because we do not have a suitable instrument for the participation grade.  
10
 Note that only one student has the lowest possible exam grade and no student has the highest possible exam 
grade, which shows that no floor or ceiling effects are caused by the grade scale. The GPA is a weighted 
average–by the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) course credit points—of all the 
graded components available at the end of the academic year 2011/2012. The same data are used by Feld and 
Zölitz (2017). For most of the students, the GPA measure consisted of eight regular courses (6.5 ECTS) and two 
skills courses (three ECTS) that are compulsory in the first year of the bachelor of economics program. 
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Table 1: Predictions, Grades, and Overestimation  
  Mean S.D. Min 0.25 0.50 0.75 Max 
 Expected exam grade 7.07 0.86 5.50 6.50 7.00 7.50 9.25 
 Realized exam grade 6.45 2.01 0.00 5.10 6.65 7.80 9.85 
 Exam overestimation 0.63 1.70 -2.55 -0.60 0.25 1.65 5.50 
 GPA 7.11 1.41 4.04 5.97 7.42 8.33 9.38 
Note: The data in this table are based on the estimation sample. Exam overestimation is equal to the expected 
exam grade minus the realized exam grade. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Exam Grades
 
Note: This figure is based on the estimation sample. 
5. Results 
Figure 2 plots the exam predictions against the actual exam grades. If all students had perfect 
foresight about their exam grades, the relationship between the predicted and actual grades 
would be shown by the 45-degree (solid) line. The figure shows the typical pattern of many 
Dunning–Kruger effect studies: Those with low grades vastly overestimate their grades while 
those with high grades, on average, slightly underestimate them. However, as discussed in 
Section 3, the relationship between performance (actual grades) and overestimation shown in 
Figure 1 is at least partly caused by measurement error. 
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Figure 2: Actual versus Expected Exam Grades 
 
Note: This figure is based on the estimation sample. The solid line is the 45-degree line and the dashed line is 
the OLS regression line. 
 
To correct for bias caused by measurement error, we estimate the Dunning–Kruger 
effect using a two-stage least squares IV approach. The following equations show the first and 
second stages: 
 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 = 𝜁0 + 𝜁1 𝐺𝑃𝐴 + 𝜃  (11) 
 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒̂ + 𝜂, (12) 
where the variable names are self-explanatory. 
The IV estimation corrects for bias caused by measurement error if the instrument 
GPA fulfills two assumptions. First, it needs to be correlated with the exam grade. This is 
plausible because similar skills often determine grades in different courses. Second, the GPA 
measurement error needs to be uncorrelated with skill, overconfidence, and the exam grade’s 
measurement error (see Section 3.4). We think of measurement error as mostly transitory and 
unpredictable factors that influence academic performance, such as guessing the correct 
answer on multiple choice questions and disturbing seat neighbors during an exam.
11
 These 
                                                 
11
 Recall that we define skill as the ability to perform well on a test. Factors that are predictable and consistently 
influence test performance are therefore included in our broad definition of skill. 
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factors are arguably unrelated to skill and overconfidence. We might be worried that the 
measurement error components of the exam and GPA are correlated, because some factors, 
such as being sick, affect students’ performance in multiple time periods. However, we do not 
think this is a concern because the last grade of the GPA was graded eight months before the 
exam. The GPA measurement error is therefore likely uncorrelated with the measurement 
error of the exam. 
Table 2 shows estimates of the Dunning–Kruger effect. We report OLS estimates in 
Column (1) as a benchmark. The OLS estimate shows that a one-point increase in the exam 
grade is associated with a decrease of 0.77 in overestimation. This estimate, however, is likely 
too large (in absolute terms) because of measurement error. Column (2) shows the first stage 
of the IV estimation. As expected, the GPA is highly predictive of a student’s exam grades. 
The F-statistic of the excluded instrument is large, which means that we do not worry about 
weak instrument bias. Column (3) shows the estimated coefficients of the second stage. The 
estimated effect of skill is negative and highly significant. An increase in skill of one grade 
point is related to a decrease in overconfidence by 0.60 grade points, a large effect that is 
substantially smaller (i.e., less negative) than OLS estimates would suggest. The Wu–
Hausmann test shows that the difference between OLS and IV estimates is statistically 
significant (p-value: 0.004). This result confirms that measurement error causes a substantial 
overestimation of the Dunning–Kruger effect. Columns (4) to (6) show that including 
additional controls for student characteristics hardly changes the OLS or IV estimates and also 
with additional controls the Wu-Hausmann test confirms that both estimates are significantly 
different from each other (p-value: 0.013). 
  
14 
 
Table 2: Estimates of the Dunning–Kruger Effect 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS 
First  
Stage 
Second 
Stage OLS 
First  
Stage 
Second 
Stage 
Dep. Variable Overest. Exam Grade Overest. Overest. Exam Grade Overest. 
              
Exam grade -0.769*** 
 
-0.600*** -0.781*** 
 
-0.619*** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.073) (0.034) 
 
(0.077) 
GPA 
 
0.855*** 
  
0.799*** 
 
  
(0.152) 
  
(0.170) 
 Constant 5.583*** 0.370 4.495*** 6.249*** 0.553 5.211*** 
 
(0.258) (1.155) (0.479) (0.366) (1.492) (0.581) 
       Controls No No No Yes  Yes Yes 
F excl. instrument 
 
31.6 
  
22.0 
 Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 
R-squared 0.821 0.362 0.782 0.847 0.394 0.815 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Additional controls include dummy variables for female, 
German, Dutch, and field of study (economics = 1). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
We might be worried that the IV estimates are biased if the GPA measurement error 
has a direct effect on overconfidence. Having good luck in the first year may cause students to 
be more overconfident. This mechanism would lead to a positive correlation between the 
GPA measurement error and overconfidence and thus a positive bias of the estimate of the 
relationship between skill and overconfidence.
12
 We think such a bias is, if it exists, small for 
two reasons. First, the measurement error component of the GPA is arguably small because 
the GPA is the average of the grades of eight first-year courses. Second, the effect of GPA 
measurement error on overconfidence is, if anything, small, because the GPA consists of 
courses that the students took at least eight months before the exam. Further, when we 
compare this potential bias with the OLS bias, we can see that the biases go in different 
directions. OLS estimates are negatively biased and therefore the Dunning–Kruger effect is 
overestimated. This bias means that, even though we observe a negative and statistically 
significant OLS coefficient, we cannot rule out that there is no relationship between skill and 
                                                 
12
 This bias can also be seen in Equation (8) where a positive effect of luck component on GPA on 
overconfidence is reflected in 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐∗, 𝜀2) > 0. 
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overconfidence. In contrast, the potential IV bias would lead to an underestimation of the 
Dunning–Kruger effect. We therefore interpret our estimates as a lower bound. 
Overall, our results provide evidence of the Dunning–Kruger effect: The negative 
coefficient of the (predicted) exam grade shows that overconfidence declines with skill. We 
can further use the predicted exam grades, our unbiased measure of skill, and the estimates of 
𝛼 and 𝛽1 in Column (3) of Table 2 to demonstrate that the Dunning–Kruger effect holds in 
our sample: The predicted overconfidence of the student of the 10th percentile of the skill 
distribution (predicted exam grade = 4.49) is equal to 1.41 (4.68 - 0.60*4.49) while the 
predicted overconfidence of a student of the 90th percentile of the skill distribution (predicted 
exam grade = 7.83) is equal to -0.20 (4.68 - 0.60*7.83). In line with the Dunning–Kruger 
effect, low-skilled students are very overconfident while high-skilled students are more 
accurate in assessing their skill. 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown how measurement error can lead to a negative relationship between 
performance and overestimation, even if skill and overconfidence are unrelated. We have 
estimated the Dunning–Kruger effect using an IV approach. Our findings support the 
existence of the Dunning–Kruger effect: Low-skilled students are very overconfident while 
high-skilled students are more accurate in assessing their skill. As expected from our 
methodological discussion, this relationship is significantly weaker than OLS estimates would 
suggest. This result confirms that taking measurement error into account is crucial when 
estimating the Dunning–Kruger effect. 
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APPENDIX 
A1: Eliciting Performance Expectations after the Test 
The relationship between skill and overconfidence may be different before and after the test. 
To allow for this possibility, we model overconfidence after the test, 𝑜𝑐𝑎
∗ , as a linear function 
of skill: 
 𝑜𝑐𝑎
∗ = 𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑠
∗ + 𝜏. (A1) 
The main difference between this model and Equation (4) is that we allow the effect of skill 
on overconfidence to be different after the test. Analogously to the discussion in Section 3.2, 
we assume that the error term 𝜏 has a mean of zero and is independent of all included 
variables. Taking a test provides feedback on one’s skill and Ryvkin, Krajč, and Ortmann 
(2012) show that feedback improves calibration, particularly among low performers. We 
therefore expect the relationship between skill and overconfidence to be less pronounced after 
the test, that is, 𝛾1 is smaller in absolute terms (i.e., less negative) than 𝛽1. 
The main difference in estimating the Dunning–Kruger effect is that luck on the test 
may be known—at least partly—after the test. To allow for luck that is known and luck that is 
unknown after the test, we express performance as 
𝑝 = 𝑠∗ +  𝜀𝑘 +  𝜀𝑢, (A2) 
where 𝜀𝑘 and 𝜀𝑢 are the known and unknown parts of luck, which we assume to be random 
mean-zero error terms. In particular, we assume that both error terms are uncorrelated with 
skill overconfidence and each other. To obtain an idea about both types of luck, consider a 
student taking a test. The student likely knows after the test whether he or she prepared for the 
right kind of questions, but not whether he or she guessed correctly on multiple choice 
questions. We further assume that students account for their known luck but not for their 
unknown luck when stating their expected performance after the test, 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝑎:  
𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝑎 ≡ 𝑠
∗ + 𝑜𝑐𝑎
∗ + 𝜀𝑘 (A3) 
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We define overestimation after the test, 𝑜𝑒𝑎, as the difference between expected performance 
after the test and performance, 
𝑜𝑒𝑎 ≡ 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝑎 − 𝑝, (A4) 
  
which can be decomposed into its respective elements shown in Equations (A2) and (A3) to 
show that overestimation after the test is equal to overconfidence after the test minus 
unknown luck: 
𝑜𝑒𝑎 = (𝑠
∗ + 𝑜𝑐𝑎
∗ + 𝜀𝑘) − (𝑠
∗ + 𝜀𝑘 + 𝜀𝑢) 
𝑜𝑒𝑎 = 𝑜𝑐𝑎
∗ − 𝜀𝑢. 
(A4) 
We then can express 𝑠∗ = 𝑝 − 𝜀𝑘 −  𝜀𝑢 and 𝑜𝑐𝑎
∗ = 𝑜𝑒𝑎 + 𝜀𝑢. If we substitute and rearrange 
these into Equation (A1), we obtain the following expression:  
𝑜𝑒𝑎 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑝 + 𝜏 − 𝛾1𝜀𝑒 − 𝜀𝑢(1 + 𝛾1) 
𝑜𝑒𝑎 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑝 + 𝜑, 
(A5) 
with the composite error term 𝜑 = 𝜏 − 𝛾1𝜀𝑒 − 𝜀𝑢(1 + 𝛾1). 
It is straightforward to see that OLS leads to biased estimates of 𝛾1 because the known 
and unknown luck components are part of performance and the composite error term. The 
simple OLS bias is equal to 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝,𝜑)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
. To obtain a clearer picture of its direction, we 
decompose and rearrange the bias term as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑣((𝑠∗ +  𝜀𝑘 +  𝜀𝑢), (𝜏 − 𝛾1𝜀𝑘 − 𝜀𝑢(1 + 𝛾1)))
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
 
−𝛾1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
− (1 + 𝛾1)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
. 
(A6) 
The two terms of Equation (A6) allow us to understand the direction of the bias in 
eight scenarios, which depend on the role of known and unknown measurement error. In 
particular, we consider the cases with 1) no measurement error, 2) only known measurement 
error, 3) only unknown measurement error, and 4) known and unknown measurement error. 
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For each of these cases, we consider two cases of 𝛾1: first, the case where -1< 𝛾1 < 0. This 
case reflects a situation in which the relationship between skill and overconfidence is 
negative, as suggested by the Dunning–Kruger effect, but larger than -1, because 𝛾1 ≤ -1 
would mean that self-assessed skill stays constant or even declines with actual skill (see 
Section 3.3). The second case is 𝛾1= 0. This case reflects a situation in which there is no 
relationship between skill and overconfidence and the empirical negative relationship between 
performance and overestimation is a statistical artifact driven by measurement error. 
Table A1 shows the directions of the bias in the resulting eight scenarios. If 
performance measures skill perfectly (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) = 0 and (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) = 0), both terms in 
Equation (A6) are equal to zero and OLS estimates are unbiased. If performance measures 
skill with some error but this error is perfectly known (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) > 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) = 0), the 
second bias term is equal to zero. This means that OLS is unbiased if there is no relationship 
between skill and overconfidence (𝛾1= 0) and underestimates the Dunning–Kruger effect 
when the relationship is negative (𝛾1 < 0). If performance measures skill with some error but 
this error is completely unknown (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) > 0), the first bias term is zero 
and OLS leads to a negative bias if the Dunning–Kruger effect exists (-1 ≤ 𝛾1 < 0) and if it 
does not (𝛾1= 0). Finally, the most realistic scenario is that performance measures skill with 
some error and this error is known only to some extent after the test (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) > 0 and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) > 0). In this case, the direction of the bias again depends on the true relationship 
between skill and overconfidence. If the Dunning–Kruger effect is correct, the bias may be 
positive or negative, depending on whether the positive bias of the first term is larger than the 
negative bias of the second term. If the Dunning–Kruger effect is incorrect and there is no 
relationship between skill and overconfidence (𝛾1= 0), OLS leads to an overestimation of the 
Dunning–Kruger effect. 
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Table A1: OLS Bias when Eliciting Performance Expectations after the Test 
 (1) (2) 
Measurement error  -1 < 𝛾1 < 0 𝛾1= 0 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) = 0 & 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) = 0 unbiased unbiased 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) > 0 & 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) = 0 positive bias  
(underestimation of DKE) 
unbiased 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) = 0 & 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) > 0 negative bias  
(overestimation of DKE) 
negative bias  
(overestimation of DKE) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) > 0 & 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) > 0 
? 
negative bias  
(overestimation of DKE) 
Note: This table shows the directions of the bias for the eight scenarios that depend on 𝛾1, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘) = 0, and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢). The Dunning–Kruger effect (DKE) states that 𝛾1is negative, so a positive bias is an underestimation of 
the DKE and a negative bias is an overestimation of the DKE. 
 
How does the magnitude of this bias compare to the bias when performance is elicited 
before the test? For comparison, recall that when performance is elicited before the test, the 
bias is equal to −(1 + 𝛽1)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝)
. This term is analogous to the second term of Equation (A6). 
In the most realistic scenario, where luck is known to some extent after the test, the OLS bias 
is likely to be less negative (or more positive) for two reasons. First, in the case that the 
Dunning–Kruger effect does not hold, the bias is smaller, because the unknown part of the 
measurement error is only a subset of the overall measurement error and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑢) <  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀). 
Second, if the Dunning–Kruger effect holds, the first term of Equation (A6) leads to a positive 
bias, counterbalancing the negative bias of the second term. 
We conclude that, because test takers are unlikely to perfectly know their luck after 
the test, we cannot rule out that the observed negative relationship between performance and 
overestimation elicited after the test is a statistical artifact. The magnitude of the overall bias 
is, however, likely smaller. 
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How does eliciting performance expectations after the test affect IV estimates? 
Analogous to Equation (10), the following equation shows the decomposed IV estimator of 
𝛾1: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑒𝑎, 𝑝2)
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑝, 𝑝2)
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐𝑎, 𝑠
∗) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐𝑎, 𝜀2) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑢, 𝑠
∗) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑢, 𝜀2)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠∗) +  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠∗, 𝜀2) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑘, 𝑠∗) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑘, 𝜀2) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑢, 𝑠∗) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑢, 𝜀2)
. 
(A7) 
Recall that the original performance 𝑝 measures skill with a classical measurement error, 
which implies that skill is unrelated to the known and unknown luck of this performance 
(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑢, 𝑠
∗) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑘, 𝑠∗) = 0). If this is the case, we can see from Equation (A7) that IV 
corrects for bias caused by measurement error if the luck portion of the second skill measure 
is uncorrelated with skill (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠∗, 𝜀2) = 0), overconfidence (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑜𝑐𝑎, 𝜀2) = 0), and the 
known and unknown luck parts of the original performance (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑘, 𝜀2) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑢, 𝜀2) = 0). 
In principle, these cases should be equally plausible, whether performance expectations are 
elicited before or after the test. 
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A2: Questionnaire 
Page 1 of the questionnaire starts below: 
Dear student, 
I am [anonymized]. My research concerns the relation between grade expectations and 
realised grades.  
I would like to ask you for your expectations of your grade in the [course name] exam and 
your participation grade. Please give your best estimates. You can enter three lotteries if 
your estimates are close to your actual results. In each lottery you can win one of three VVV 
vouchers worth €20. In total, you can win VVV vouchers of €60. 
At the end of the survey, you will be asked to enter your student ID. The ID is required to 
compare your estimates with your actual results. If you win one of the lotteries, the ID will be 
used to look up your email so that I can inform you about your win. 
I will treat this information confidentially and ensure your anonymity. No individual 
information will be passed on to anybody (not even your tutor or course coordinator). I will 
also not report any information which can be used to identify you.  
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me via: [anonymized] 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
[anonymized] 
 
 
This is how the lotteries are going to work: 
 
Lottery 1: If your exam grade (in your first attempt) is within 0.25 points of your expected 
grade, you enter a lottery in which two winners are randomly drawn. If you do not attend 
the first sit, your second sit grade is considered for the lottery. Each winner will receive a 
VVV voucher worth €20. 
 
Lottery 2: I calculate the actual percentile of your exam grade compared to the exam 
grades of the first attempts of all students in this course. If your final exam grade is in 
your expected percentile range, you enter a lottery in which two winners are randomly 
drawn. Each winner will receive a VVV voucher worth €20. 
 
Lottery 3: If your actual participation grade is within 0.25 points of your expected 
participation grade, you enter a lottery in which we randomly draw two winners, who will 
receive a VVV voucher worth €20.]  
 
 
 
Questionnaire Grade Expectations - Course [course name] 
***************************************************************************
******* 
 
1. Which grade do you expect to get in the exam of the course [course name]?  
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If you do NOT intend to attend the first sit, please state your expectations for the second sit (resit).  
 
 I expect to get a __ __.__ __ in the exam. [0.00-10.00]  
 
2. Please indicate in which percentile range you expect your exam grade to be in? 
 
The percentile shows the percentage of students in this course which have a lower exam grade (in their first attempt) 
than you. High values mean high exam grades compared to the exam grades of the other students in this course.  
 
Please mark your expected percentile range with an X. 
 
 1-10%  11%- 
20% 
21%- 
30% 
31%- 
40% 
41%- 
50% 
51%- 
60% 
61%- 
70% 
71%- 
80% 
81%- 
90% 
91%- 
100% 
Your 
percentile: 
          
 Worst 
10%  
        Best  
10%  
 
3. Which participation grade do you expect to get in this course?  
 
Please state your guess rounded to the next quarter point so that it ends with .00, .25, .50 or .75.  
 
 I expect to get a__ __ .__ __as participation grade. [0.00-10.00]  
 
 
4. Do you consider failing on purpose in the first sit of the exam in this course – either 
by not attending or by handing in an incomplete exam – in order to get a higher 
grade in the second sit? 
 
     Yes   No 
 
   
5. What is your gender? 
 
     Male  Female 
 
6. What is your student ID?  
 
 ID_______________ 
 
 
 
Please fold this page in half after filling it out. 
 
 
